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Abstract: Global concerns about climate change, as confirmed at COP21, have 
led to lower carbon emissions environmental policies, particularly in the road 
transport sector. Through an empirical analysis of low carbon vehicle (LCV) 
policies in California, this paper contrasts the findings from diverse distribution 
theories between income quintiles – used as a proxy for societal groups – to 
address vertical equity concerns and offer an overview of impact distribution to 
policy makers. Thus, it contributes in operationalising ethical theories within 
transport cost benefit analysis and revisiting impact distribution when 
promoting low carbon vehicles. Findings indicate that manufacturer penalties 
are the most effective policy measure to avoid cost transfer between 
stakeholders. Yet, the analysis shows that those purchasing small LCVs may 
face disproportional vehicle purchase cost increases which needs to be 
considered by policy makers. Thus, this paper makes a methodological 
contribution regarding CBA in practice as well as providing policy relevant 
recommendations. 
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1 Introduction 
The use of cost benefit analysis (CBA) has been dominating transport policy appraisal for 
several decades in developed countries, particularly in Europe (Odgaard et al., 2005; 
Mackie and Worsley, 2013). Despite the ongoing diffusion of ICT to improve data 
accuracy in a lot of sectors including transport (Thomopoulos et al., 2015), this prevailing 
position appears not to have been significantly challenged yet due to the virtues of CBA 
(Eliasson and Lundberg, 2012; Mackie, 2011), though this method has been subject to an 
increasing debate in the realm of other sectors such as healthcare (Folland et al., 2007). 
Nevertheless, certain criticisms of CBA practice remain unresolved as highlighted in the 
literature (Beukers et al., 2012; ITF, 2011; Mouter et al., 2013b, 2015; Thomopoulos  
et al., 2009; van Wee, 2011; Vickerman, 2007). 
One of the major criticisms of CBA revolves around impact quantification and 
monetisation (Mackie and Preston, 1998), whereas another key one is about the 
assessment of impact distribution. Wider economic impacts, equity and other  
non-monetised impacts are not included formally in the appraisal and are not considered 
explicitly by decision makers since they form part of separate tables which are not 
incorporated in the benefit-cost ratio (BCR) (Mackie and Worsley, 2013). These are not 
excluded per se from conventional CBA (van Wee, 2012), yet impact distribution often 
does not form a key part of the analysis. The latter issue is intertwined with equity and 
ethical issues which are implicitly addressed when implementing a utilitarian-based 
approach. It is acknowledged here that not all transport policies include equity as one of 
their explicit objectives, although issues such as climate change or environmental 
pollution are directly relevant since the whole of the population in a given geographical 
area is affected. Hence, equity concerns and ethics are intertwined with impact 
distribution due to their implicit inclusion in the welfare maximisation objective of CBA, 
which forms an identified weakness of this appraisal method in practice (Thomopoulos  
et al., 2009). 
As already pointed out, both the contents and process of CBA should be improved to 
aid transport appraisal overall (Beukers et al., 2012; van Wee, 2012), potentially focusing 
more on the actual role of this widely used method which could be more subtle (Mouter 
et al., 2013a). Alternative approaches and theories may be used within a wider appraisal 
framework having CBA at its core (Annema et al., 2015; Thomopoulos, 2010). Such an 
approach would utilise the strengths of CBA while addressing some of its weaknesses. 
This would also satisfy the requirement set out by Roeser (2012) according to which 
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policy makers “should not be unemotional calculators […] but through a cultivation of 
their moral emotions and sensitivity engage in more responsible decision making”, since 
“we need emotions to make a rational decision” (Roeser, 2006). Along the same lines, 
this paper demonstrates that alternative approaches can and should be tested in practice to 
enhance the assessment of impact distribution among diverse socio-economic groups. 
This objective can be met through case studies, so the aim of this paper is accomplished 
through an application of a system dynamics model (Walther et al., 2010; Harrison and 
Shepherd, 2014) providing the input to improve the contents and prospects of CBA 
(Turner, 2007). 
Previous research has focussed on aggregate policy impacts of biofuels, electric 
vehicles or other emission reduction schemes (Ghermandy et al., 2013; Marsden and 
Hess, 2011; Oxley et al., 2012; Podhora et al., 2013; Rode et al., 2014), but not on impact 
distribution among societal groups. Therefore, this paper contrasts findings between 
household income quintiles used as a proxy for societal groups to extend previous 
findings and offer an overview of different impact distribution to policy makers. The use 
of this proxy is justified by the strong correlation identified by Morton et al. (2016) 
between LCVs and income. By focusing on vertical equity, this issue is brought to the 
attention of both scholars and decision makers. Based on Harrison and Shepherd (2014) 
the issue of low carbon vehicles (LCVs) uptake and the implications on predefined  
socio-economic groups is assessed through an empirical analysis. In this way, the 
overarching paper aim to operationalise different strands of research (Harrison and 
Shepherd, 2014; Thomopoulos and Grant-Muller, 2013; van Wee, 2011) and improve the 
practice of CBA is pursued. 
Thus, the contribution of this paper lays in the application of selected ethical theories 
within transport CBA to revisit the issue of impact distribution when promoting low 
carbon policies which is apposite after the COP21 held in Paris. This paper starts off with 
an overview of common CBA criticisms then followed by a brief review of applicable 
ethical theories. By applying these theories in the context of the LCVs uptake in 
California, Section 4 offers evidence of the applicability of the suggested approach in 
different contexts. Hence, it contributes in the ongoing debate regarding the improvement 
of CBA in practice. 
2 Transport and ethics literature 
Transport can be both the cause and resolution of societal inequalities. The provision of 
transport for access to goods and services contrasts with potentially negative safety, 
environmental and social impacts, and as such can be subject to ethical debate (Mullen, 
2012). There is a pertinent need at the moment to review and improve transport 
evaluation practices in developed countries amidst recession and budgetary constraints in 
Europe, the US and Japan, alongside the revitalised discussion about climate change 
globally (UNFCCC, 2015). Perhaps ethics and distributional implications have been 
neglected for a long time by academics and those involved in transport assessment, so 
recent publications aim at bridging this gap (Martens, 2015; Thomopoulos et al., 2009; 
van Wee, 2011) while addressing contemporary needs and the need to incorporate  
non-quantifiable impacts in the appraisal (Mackie and Preston, 1998). A similar research 
gap has been reported within a related sector, namely bioenergy, resulting in a need to 
reassess overall benefits of environmental policies and refocus attention to key issues 
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surrounding such innovative policies including its social dimension (Levidow and 
Papaioannou, 2013). The novelty of such approaches lays in the fact that decision making 
in the transport sector has been dominated by engineers who perceive ethics as a  
sub-discipline of philosophy which is irrelevant to transport in their view (Bowen, 2012; 
van Wee, 2011). It is this identified gap which forms the rationale of this paper. 
The complexity and abstraction of ethical theories may have rightly discouraged its 
inclusion in assessment frameworks to date, but theories such as the ones suggested by 
Rawls or Walzer may open new horizons to transport debates. Explaining such theories in 
more detail is out of the scope of this paper, yet both philosophy and ethics have a lot to 
offer to transport policy makers by challenging established practices (Harrison and 
Shepherd, 2014; Thomopoulos, 2013; van Wee, 2011). Attempts to operationalise ethical 
theories are not new as discussed in this section. However, attempts to operationalise 
theories such as Rawls’ in such a detailed level have been rare to date. 
On one hand, CBA remains the most commonly used assessment method in Europe 
(Odgaard et al., 2005) and other developed countries (Mackie and Worsley, 2013). On 
the other hand, the established view that welfare maximisation advocated by CBA should 
be the sole indicator used in transport interventions has been challenged, fostering 
approaches incorporating other methods such as multi-criteria analysis (MCA) (Annema 
et al., 2015; Guehnemann et al., 2012; Thomopoulos and Grant-Muller, 2013). Equally, 
Gardiner (2011) challenges utilitarianism which underpins CBA, followed by the severe 
criticism of CBA paralysis due to weaknesses of this method owed to the discount rate 
used and intergenerational equity. Others (Beukers et al., 2012; Mouter et al., 2013b, 
2015; Pearce et al., 2006; Thomopoulos et al., 2007; Thomopoulos et al., 2009) have 
summarised the disadvantages of CBA, acknowledging though certain strengths of this 
method largely based on its appeal to policy makers. Nonetheless, acute views about 
CBA are not a new phenomenon since its critics have expressed their views at least since 
the 1970s (Turner, 1979). 
Applying constructive criticism on CBA through the provision of useful suggestions 
has been a relatively new strand. This paper falls within this realm since it recognises 
certain virtues of CBA, but addresses its weakness regarding the disaggregation of impact 
distribution derived from welfare maximisation. A suitable way of achieving this is by 
introducing equity theories in transport assessment through CBA. In spite of the high 
number of authors who have developed and written about equity theories, only limited 
cases exist where such theories have been applied in the transport sector and fewer about 
LCVs. 
Martens (2009) for example focuses on Walzer’s (1983) spheres of justice stating that 
transport – conceived as accessibility by him – should have its own distributional sphere 
of justice since it has become a necessity in the 21st century. Remarkably, he argues that 
neither mobility nor accessibility can be distributed based on the principle of equality. 
This view can be justified, but can be also overruled if equality is defined accordingly 
(e.g. equal annual cost of transport either in absolute terms or as an income proportion to 
use a LCV to commute to work – i.e., avoiding vehicle ownership). Neither Rawls’ 
(1972) equity principles satisfy the strict conditions set out by Martens (2009). Yet, based 
on Walzer’s spheres theory, it is important to identify according to which equity or 
distributive principle the ‘transport good’ should be allocated. This query is explored 
through the empirical analysis in Section 4. 
Nevertheless, the adjusted Rawls (1972) principles operationalised by Khisty (1996) 
including the egalitarian principle appear to be appropriate for the analysis of this paper, 
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thus are explained in Section 3 and utilised to derive the results discussed in Section 4. 
Such an approach warrants pursuing welfare maximisation both for the society overall 
and for certain social groups, addressing vertical equity concerns. The fact that it is 
uncommon for decision makers to share the same views about the applicable ethical 
theory1 in each case has obvious implications for the appraisal outcome since no common 
vision is shared. An increased interest about Rawls’ theory could initiate new discussions 
among scholars and decision makers which could eventually lead in improving CBA 
practice. 
3 Methodology 
The methodology applied in this paper is based on a case study by Walther et al. (2010) 
which models the Californian low emission vehicles regulation to understand 
manufacturer response in an attempt to increase the market share of zero emission 
vehicles (ZEVs). This was extended by Harrison and Shepherd (2014) in an attempt to 
assess the impact of regulatory approaches on LCV purchases within a proposed ethical 
framework. Based on Harrison and Shepherd (2014) and Thomopoulos and Grant-Muller 
(2013), further analysis has been conducted here to adapt that case study, focusing on 
vehicle purchase costs instead of manufacturers’ market shares to highlight short term 
distributional impacts and social implications of such environmental policies. The 
analysis in those papers includes both demand and supply side policy measures which 
constitute the backbone of the alternative policy scenarios developed. These scenarios are 
useful both for academics and decision makers because they provide the opportunity to 
test the impacts of alternative policies including the business as usual (BAU) scenario. 
Consequently, the focus in this paper is the deriving vertical equity implications for 
societal groups observed through a restricted CBA conducted from the perspective of a 
single LCV manufacturer operating in California for just over a decade (2009–2020). 
It is worth mentioning here that although it is widely acknowledged (EC, 2013; IPCC, 
2007; Stern, 2006, 2013; Rode et al., 2014) that LCVs should be adopted – either in the 
short-term or in the long-term – this adoption should not exacerbate inequalities between 
societal groups. The European Union has introduced a flexible legislation allowing 
manufacturers to assess their carbon emissions not per individual car but for their whole 
car fleet, set at 130 g of CO2/km for 2012–2015 and to 95 g CO2/km from 2020 (EC, 
2013). One of the motivations of this paper has been that although individual car use 
overall may decrease in the future as a result of environmental policies, certain already 
vulnerable societal groups – who may be more car-dependent – e.g. unemployed, elderly, 
disabled, should not be disadvantaged during the adjustment period. Rather this 
adjustment is expected to be facilitated through relevant government policies, 
maintaining or increasing vertical equity. Along the same lines, Harrison and Shepherd 
(2014) have demonstrated that the Regulation alternative policy scenario is the one with 
the highest potential success rate in reducing carbon emissions. Yet, this may favour 
those already most well off and users may bear more costs than government or industry, 
creating a problematic policy decision. Therefore this alternative scenario is used as the 
foundation of the core policy option in this paper. 
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Nonetheless, it is essential to present here all the background information and 
assumptions of this analysis to offer a complete overview. The context of this analysis is 
California due to the advanced position of this state regarding the introduction of LCVs 
and the existence of previous analyses in that state. A further reason has been the sharper 
fall of family income in California compared to the rest of the US, particularly for those 
in the lower income quintiles, between 2007 and 2010 (Bohn and Schiff, 2011), which 
may have an adverse impact on household decisions in relation to LCV purchases since 
higher income levels have been strongly correlated with higher LCV purchases (Morton 
et al., 2016). Additionally, California is the only US state with four major cities with a 
median family income of less than $30,000 available for new car purchases (Guillot, 
2013). The time horizon (2009–2020) has been selected based on data availability. 
Further information and data about California used in this paper are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1 Case study facts 
Population (2010) 37,253,956 
Households (2007–2011) 12,433,172 
Population density per sq.mile (2010) 239.1 
Average household size (2007–2011) 2.91 
Median household income (2007–2011) $61,632 
Personal income (2009) $41,034 
Registered cars 22,083,049 
CVRA trucks 440,751 
Non-CVRA trucks 5,061,180 
Miscellaneous vehicles 126,705 
Total number of vehicles 27,711,685 
Vehicles per household 2.17 
Source: CalStats (2012), CFED (2011) and US Census (2013) 
Five household income quintiles2 (Table 2) have been used to create five societal groups 
(Q1–Q5 in Section 4.1) and review the impact distribution of costs and benefits of the 
uptake of LCVs in California. Each quintile has been designed to include 20% of the 
population based on CFED (2011) therefore societal groups include the same number of 
people but inevitably reflect diverse total incomes. Those who belong to the lower 
income quintile are less likely to own a car currently; therefore they are expected to 
benefit less (if at all) through any policies such as LCV purchase subsidies. Transport 
costs in California reflect the third largest budget share for the 25% of the lowest income 
households, whilst they comprise the second largest budget share after housing for all the 
rest of the households (PPIC, 2004b). Thus it is assumed that income can be used as a 
useful proxy in this paper. 
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Table 2 Income quintiles in California 
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Having reviewed the societal grouping by Khisty (1996) where randomly defined income 
classes have been used, the approach in this paper is using the aforementioned income 
quintiles based on an egalitarian approach for each individual. By estimating the mean 
income for each quintile the total income for each quintile has been derived (Table 2). 
Another assumption used in this paper is that each quintile spends different income 
proportions for new vehicles (SBE, 2010) and will continue to spend similar income 
proportions for new LCVs in the future. As shown in Figure 1, spending on new vehicles 
increases from 3.1% of income for the lowest income quintile to 8.9% for the highest 
income quintile. Not surprisingly, income spent on used cars purchases decreases for the 
two highest income quintiles, since these users are able to afford new vehicles due to 
their higher earnings. However, these proportions are distinct from the income proportion 
spent on private vehicle expenditures which is 19% for low income quintiles and may 
reach 35% for very low income quintiles, while it averages 16% for all other income 
quintiles (PPIC, 2004a). 
Figure 1 Household spending on new and used vehicles as a proportion of total California 
taxable spending by income quintile (see online version for colours) 
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After establishing the background and assumptions of this analysis, it is also necessary to 
highlight the links with the contents of CBA. Since CBA revolves around welfare 
maximisation which in turn is intertwined with Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, this paper 
illustrates potential improvements about impact distribution elucidated through a CBA 
example. Due to the objectives of this paper, the focus here is on the distribution of 
vehicle purchase costs for users. Therefore, the User Purchase cost is distributed in each 
quintile based on alternative ethical theories. A range of theories have been selected 
based on the literature review and the prerequisite to be applicable in the current context 
of transport appraisal. These theories have been operationalised to five principles, 
namely: 
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1 equal shares 
2 egalitarian 
3 maximum range between groups 
4 minimum floor of impacts i.e. Rawls 
5 equal proportions. 
More details about their operationalisation are discussed in Sections 4 and 5. 
In this way, this paper bridges the identified gap between Khisty (1996) and the need 
to introduce ethical theories in transport appraisal already discussed by scholars (Martens, 
2009; Mouter, 2014; Thomopoulos, 2010; van Wee, 2011). Established inequality 
indicators (Gini, Theil, Atkinson) may not always produce similar results which is 
justified according to Sen (1973) due to the fact that each of these indicators is founded 
on alternative ethical judgements implying alternative approaches on the aggregation of 
information contained in the distribution. To complement the discussion about impact 
distribution with policy relevant findings, three policy options as described by Harrison 
and Shepherd (2014) are reviewed (Section 4.1): 
1 subsidy 
2 regulation 
3 both policies. 
To explore diverse impacts and minimise the intensification of vertical equity 
implications, these are contrasted with the BAU scenario. 
4 Results and discussion 
Based on the methodology described in the previous section, the results about LCVs are 
presented here followed by a discussion of the arising issues and the implications for 
improving the contents of CBA. 
4.1 Results 
Benefits in this analysis include reduced emissions (in MtGHG) which vary depending on 
the uptake and use of LCVs. Studies in Italy for example (Calabrese, 2015) have 
highlighted the potential benefits through government subsidies for the automotive 
industry. However, those studies have not focussed on distributional impacts and have 
excluded analysis about specific user groups. Analysis by others though (Table 3) has 
demonstrated two interesting findings related to this study. Crist (2012) has discussed 
how the introduction of government subsidies may significantly reduce the positive 
impacts of BEVs (used as a proxy of LCV in that case), which generates demand for a 
fruitful discussion about the cost and benefits of such policies. In addition, he points out 
the potential benefits for either a single manufacturer or a national sector focusing on 
BEVs manufacturing due to the anticipated benefits based on exports and international 
trade. The latter option is already being explored in France, which means that analyses 
similar to the one presented in this paper are contemporary and of high policy relevance. 
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The system dynamics model described by Harrison and Shepherd (2014) has been 
used to simulate the overall costs and benefits of different policies. Due to the aim of this 
paper and the findings of Crist (2012), we have focussed on three alternative policy 
options, namely one which included only subsidies for LCVs, one which included only 
regulation for LCVs and one which included a combination of these two policies. Table 4 
shows the costs of these policies as well as the emissions reduction impact which is the 
overall benefit in this analysis. Since the purpose of this paper has been to illustrate the 
method through this empirical analysis, we have solely focussed on costs. This is sensible 
since it has been assumed that all users are affected the same by GHGs. 
Table 3 Lifetime fiscal and social revenues for a B class French ICE and BEV (€ per vehicle) 
 ICE  BEV 
 Manufacture Use  Manufacture Use 
Consumer expenditure 14,600 17,650  24,400 10,814 
Government revenue      
VAT 2,862 4,121  4,782 2,119 
Fuel/Electricity Tax  3,375   420 
Production-related taxes 1,002 1,031  1,648 618 
Social security taxes 10,594 12,837  18,505 7,798 
Total revenue (no subsidy) 
(combined) 
14,457 
(35,821) 
21,364  24,936 
(35,892) 
10,956 
Total revenue (ex subsidy) 
(combined) 
14,457 
(35,821) 
21,364  18,956 
(29,912) 
10,956 
Notes: Assumptions: French tax rates, fuel and electricity prices, ICE fuel consumption  
5 l/100 km, BEV electricity consumption 18 kWh/100 km, 15,000 km/yr both 
vehicles [for other assumptions, see: Leurent and Windisch (2012)]. 
Source: Crist (2012) 
Table 4 Discounted costs ($bn) of the three selected policies compared to baseline 
 Government costs 
User 
purchase 
costs 
User 
running 
costs 
Industry 
costs 
Overall 
costs 
Emissions 
reduction 
(Mt GHG) 
Subsidy 1.18 –0.95 –0.18 0.13 0.18 0.97 
Regulation 0.00 50.66 –28.58 –1.05 21.03 134.95 
Both policies 1.35 49.38 –28.68 –0.93 21.11 135.57 
Source: Harrison and Shepherd (2014) 
The overall costs column demonstrates the total cost of each policy which is the main 
value to be included in the CBA. This is then disaggregated to the key categories – 
similarly to the benefit impact table (Nakamura, 2000) – which contain the government 
imposing the regulations and providing the subsidies, the Industry which includes a 
single manufacturer in this model – following Crist (2012) – and the users purchasing 
vehicles who face two types of costs i.e., purchase and running ones. Since there is a 
single manufacturer in this model for California (LCVs manufacturing is assumed to be a 
competitive market internationally) and the analysis focuses on a single market (regulated 
by one government), it is fair to assume that impact distribution matters more for 
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individuals purchasing cars rather than for the two other categories of stakeholders i.e., 
the government and the single manufacturer. Therefore the remaining tables focus on 
impact distribution of user purchase costs among the five income quintiles in California 
which is the spatial region we focussed our analysis on. 
When the government introduces subsidies to support the introduction of LCVs; this 
results in reduced purchase cost for users. Consequently, this policy has a user benefit 
($0.95 bn) in this analysis (the government bears a cost of $1.18 bn – Table 4). In reality 
though this user benefit will benefit more the upper income quintiles as they will more 
likely be the ones purchasing the more expensive LCVs and thus receiving the larger 
benefit in absolute terms. Table 5 demonstrates the impacts for all users in each quintile 
initially and then for each individual user of each quintile. Five equity theories have been 
employed to operationalise the implications for each income group. 
Table 5 Benefits distribution ($0.95 bn – Table 4) of user purchase costs among the five 
income quintile groups based on selected equity theories under the Subsidy Policy 
POLICY: SUBSIDY 
 Equal shares Egalitarian 
Maximum range 
of B between 
quintiles  
(e.g., $100 mil) 
Maximum 
ceiling/Rawls 
(e.g., $300 mil) 
Equal 
proportions 
Aggregate distribution 
Q1 $189,601,913 $407,572,024 $250,000,000 $300,000,000 $13,314,596 
Q2 $189,601,913 $260,160,119 $200,000,000 $250,000,000 $61,196,382 
Q3 $189,601,913 $158,723,214 $180,000,000 $200,000,000 $126,483,607 
Q4 $189,601,913 $90,855,357 $170,000,000 $150,000,000 $240,008,252 
Q5 $189,601,913 $30,650,000 $150,000,000 $48,000,000 $507,287,119 
Per capita distribution 
Q1 p.c. $25 $55 $34 $40 $2 
Q2 p.c. $25 $35 $27 $34 $8 
Q3 p.c. $25 $21 $24 $27 $17 
Q4 p.c. $25 $12 $23 $20 $32 
Q5 p.c. $25 $4 $20 $6 $68 
Notes: Total benefit for all users in the quintile, per capita benefit for users in quintile.  
Q1 has the lowest income, whereas Q5 has the highest income 
According to the equal shares theory, all income groups share the subsidy policy benefits 
equally ($189,601,913). The egalitarian approach advocates that the end situation should 
bring all users to a more equal situation, therefore lower incomes benefit by higher 
subsidies to allow them to purchase LCVs and/or purchase larger LCVs depending on 
their household situation. Based on the maximum range of benefits approach, the  
income quintile receiving the highest benefits should not receive an absolute benefit  
over a predefined maximum range compared to the benefits received by other quintiles 
(e.g., $100 mil). Similarly, utilising Rawlsian theory, a maximum ceiling may be 
predefined not allowing any given income quintile to receive more benefits than this 
predefined threshold (e.g., $300 mil). With such an approach it is safeguarded that 
disadvantaged groups will improve their absolute situation, while advantaged ones will 
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maintain their relatively advantageous position. On the other hand, the equal proportions 
approach is based on the distribution of benefits based on the income proportion spent by 
each quintile to purchase new cars (SBE, 2010). The fact that higher income individuals 
will receive more subsidies may appear as a paradox, but this will be discussed in the 
next section. 
Moving on to the second policy, Table 6 shows the impact distribution according to 
the regulation policy. Naturally, this policy has no financial cost for the government, 
whereas it introduces considerable costs for users intensified by the fact that 
manufacturers are able to pass regulation costs to end users (see Table 4 and Table 6). 
Therefore, costs are considerably higher compared to the benefits in the previous policy 
option and reach $27 bn for the highest income quintile (Q5) in the equal proportions 
approach (Table 6). A progressive cost distribution has been applied based on the 
Egalitarian theory, where the lowest income quintile (Q1) will have to contribute $1.5 bn, 
whilst Q5 will have to contribute almost $22 bn. A $5 bn maximum range threshold has 
been set for the respective principle, whilst a minimum range of $1.2 bn has been set for 
the Rawlsian approach based on an almost 50% contribution of the average car purchase 
expenses of the lowest income group. It is noteworthy that the equal proportions 
approach results in a lower contribution by the lowest income groups in this policy option 
compared with the subsidy policy where benefits were distributed instead of costs. 
Table 6 Cost distribution ($50.66 bn – Table 4) of user purchase costs among the five income 
quintile groups based on selected equity theories under the Regulation Policy 
POLICY: REGULATION 
 Equal shares Egalitarian 
Maximum range 
of C between 
quintiles  
(e.g., $5 bn) 
Minimum 
floor/Rawls  
($1.2 bn) 
Equal 
proportions 
Aggregate distribution 
Q1 $10,132,117,830 $1,586,000,000 $8,000,000,000 $1,227,031,388 $711,417,135 
Q2 $10,132,117,830 $4,861,428,571 $9,000,000,000 $5,519,673,679 $3,269,806,690 
Q3 $10,132,117,830 $8,492,857,143 $10,000,000,000 $9,920,282,925 $6,758,192,743 
Q4 $10,132,117,830 $13,920,476,190 $11,000,000,000 $14,118,132,450 $12,823,970,309 
Q5 $10,132,117,830 $21,808,095,238 $13,000,000,000 $19,893,612,504 $27,105,047,037 
Per capita distribution 
Q1 p.c. $1,360 $213 $1,074 $165 $95 
Q2 p.c. $1,360 $652 $1,208 $741 $439 
Q3 p.c. $1,360 $1,140 $1,342 $1,331 $907 
Q4 p.c. $1,360 $1,868 $1,476 $1,895 $1,721 
Q5 p.c. $1,360 $2,927 $1,745 $2,670 $3,638 
Notes: Total cost for all users in the quintile, per capita benefit for users in quintile.  
Q1 has the lowest income, whereas Q5 has the highest income. 
Yet, the third and most plausible policy option is based on a combination of both policies. 
As explained in Section 3, an equal contribution of the subsidy and regulation policy 
options has been incorporated in the model used for this analysis and the results are 
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shown in Table 7. The results are equivalent to the regulation policy reflecting the 
slightly lower user cost due to the positive impact of the inclusion of the subsidy policy. 
Table 7 Cost distribution ($49.38 bn – Table 4) of user purchase costs among the five income 
quintile groups based on selected equity theories under both (Subsidy and Regulation) 
policies 
BOTH POLICIES 
 Equal shares Egalitarian 
Maximum range 
of C between 
quintiles  
(e.g., $5 bn) 
Minimum 
floor/Rawls  
($1 bn) 
Equal 
proportions 
Aggregate distribution 
Q1 $9,875,267,968 $1,596,378,920 $7,000,000,000 $1,000,000,000 $693,272,734 
Q2 $9,875,267,968 $4,732,123,228 $9,000,000,000 $4,445,000,000 $3,186,411,620 
Q3 $9,875,267,968 $8,266,962,265 $10,000,000,000 $9,920,282,925 $6,585,827,827 
Q4 $9,875,267,968 $13,550,216,310 $11,000,000,000 $14,118,132,450 $12,496,900,241 
Q5 $9,875,267,968 $21,228,038,736 $12,000,000,000 $19,893,612,504 $26,413,744,002 
Per capita distribution 
Q1 p.c. $1,325.40 $214.26 $939.50 $134.21 $93.05 
Q2 p.c. $1,325.40 $635.12 $1,207.93 $596.58 $427.66 
Q3 p.c. $1,325.40 $1,109.54 $1,342.14 $1,331.44 $883.91 
Q4 p.c. $1,325.40 $1,818.63 $1,476.35 $1,894.85 $1,677.26 
Q5 p.c. $1,325.40 $2,849.10 $1,610.57 $2,670.00 $3,545.09 
Notes: Total cost for all users in the quintile, per capita benefit for users in quintile.  
Q1 has the lowest income, whereas Q5 has the highest income. 
An overview of the total contribution of each income quintile according to the five 
selected equity theories is presented in Figure 2. As anticipated the quintiles with the 
higher income (Q4 and Q5) contribute more than the quintiles with the lower income 
(Q1–Q3), particularly when the egalitarian, Rawlsian and equal proportions theories are 
applied (Figure 2). In addition to the results presented through Tables 5–7, some further 
findings come out of the analysis of the system dynamics model. Vehicle size (XS, S, M, 
L) appears to play a key role as anticipated and this is discussed in the subsequent 
section. This is justified since the introduction of very small (XS) LCVs results in 
decreased demand for all other car sizes (Walther et al., 2010). Remarkably though, 
findings suggest that purchase costs of large (L) vehicles – cICEV – have increased at a 
lower rate compared to small (S) vehicles, 28% to 13% respectively (Harrison and 
Shepherd, 2014). The latter highlights the existence of certain fixed costs for the 
manufacturing of any size of LCVs which raises vertical equity concerns. Moreover, the 
introduction of penalties about emission reduction and LCV technologies appear to be the 
most effective policy measures which could avoid the transfer of costs from 
manufacturers to those purchasing cars. 
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Figure 2 Overview of each income quintile contribution based on the five equity theories  
(see online version for colours) 
 
4.2 Discussion 
A series of issues have arisen through the empirical analysis of the LCVs uptake in 
California. First we discuss some issues based on the findings and then some wider 
methodological issues relevant to the wider aims of this paper. 
As argued by Harrison and Shepherd (2014), vehicle size may be used as an income 
proxy for such a disaggregation, using the four vehicle sizes (XS, S, M, L) as defined by 
Walther et al. (2010). If such a proxy is used, it can be assumed that lower income 
households purchase smaller sized vehicles whereas higher income households purchase 
larger vehicles. This may correspond for California but would need to be reviewed for 
other developed areas e.g., Europe, where those in higher income quintiles sometimes 
purchase small cars. Generally speaking though, lower income households have limited 
(if any) income proportion to spend on purchasing a car. Table 8 reviews the cost 
increase impacts between 2009 and 2020 for each vehicle size. If this proxy is used, then 
these vehicle purchase cost increases can be linked with the income quintiles and the 
impact distribution analysis which preceded in Section 4.1. Although the price 
differentials remain fairly constant, the simulation of different policy scenarios has 
allowed the identification of uneven cost burdens for those purchasing small vehicles (S) 
when ICE vehicles are gradually forced out of the market to reduce the overall GHGs 
impact. This may have an adverse effect for those on lower incomes (e.g., Q1 or Q2 in 
Section 4.1) which could be acknowledged in the decision making process when 
reviewing policy options, since the increase of 28% is more than double the increase for 
large vehicles. 
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Table 8 Average LCV purchase cost for various car sizes 
Car size Start year  (2009) 
Fixed baseline  
(2020) 
Both policies  
(2020) 
% difference in 
2020 between 
policies 
XS n/a 13,432 15,048 12% 
S 12,799 16,172 20,698 28% 
M 17,749 21,683 25,340 15% 
L 27,649 30,365 34,413 13% 
Notes: XS: extra small, S: small, M: medium, L: large. 
Source: Harrison and Shepherd (2014) 
Although Table 8 shows some interesting findings, it would have been useful to have 
accurate facts about the mix of vehicle size for each income quintile (or other societal 
grouping) to avoid errors in planning assumptions as well as in the definition of the BAU 
scenario and the do minimum scenario. The latter could act as a major improvement in 
the accuracy of such analyses as Mackie and Preston (1998) have pointed out and could 
be the focus of future research. Furthermore, the introduction of policies such as the 
promotion of LCVs impacts disproportionately certain groups of users who often do not 
have reasonable alternatives. For example, those who have no access at home charging 
facilities – for electric vehicles – or have high travel commitments will be disadvantaged. 
Imposing regulatory penalties would achieve the greatest GHG emission reductions, but 
would also increase purchase costs and change market shares, impacting 
disproportionately certain societal groups due to diverse income levels and car use 
reliance. When considering those who are most vulnerable to purchase cost changes,  
non-car owners may have little reliance on cars at this point in time, but their opportunity 
of purchasing a car (if needed) in the future is further prevented by the increased costs, 
deteriorating their position relatively. Similar impacts may occur for the less affluent 
societal groups and those who may already own an ICE car. 
This point brings up one of the core arguments of this paper which is the 
operationalisation of selected ethical theories to improve the contents of CBA. These are 
presented in a neutral way and without the authors’ intention of arguing in favour of any 
specific approach. Moreover, the objective is to highlight the advantage of carrying out a 
pluralist assessment. Five different approaches have been operationalised and presented 
in Section 4.1, so here we review particular points to generate discussion and provide 
some practical suggestions. In the definition of the maximum range (or ceiling) for 
example, there is an inherent issue of subjectivity since this can be an arbitrary decision. 
Yet in practice this can either be linked with an absolute sum based on a predefined 
amount which higher income quintiles can be asked to contribute or linked with the 
proportional difference between the average income of the lowest and highest income 
quintiles. The strong correlation identified (Morton et al., 2016) between higher income 
and LCVs could justify such practice. 
On the other hand, consistent use of such approaches may also create paradoxes as 
was the case in the equal proportions approach where higher incomes received more 
benefits (Table 5). Inversely, if there are net costs (the reduction of GHGs is one such 
case, although it is acknowledged that most CBAs of funded projects have net benefits) 
lower income quintiles bear lower costs. Reviewing the rest of the ethical principles 
operationalised in Section 4.1, the equal shares is probably the easiest to implement since 
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all costs or benefits are distributed equally among the societal groups. For the egalitarian 
principle, two factors have been considered in this paper: 
1 the average income of each quintile spent on new car purchases 
2 the proportional relationship between the lowest income quintile group (which has 
been used as the basis) with the other quintile income groups. 
A different point which needs to be stressed though is that in the future state revenues 
may decrease due to lower fuel tax revenues (Shepherd et al., 2012) as experienced in 
2015 due to lower oil prices globally, but they may also increase through the need to 
renew car fleets more often due to LCVs’ maintenance issues which have implications 
for user running costs. Therefore, further analysis of interactions and dynamics is 
required at diverse spatial and societal levels, specifically for government impacts of 
LCV policies. The use of system dynamics as suggested in this paper may facilitate such 
analyses further. 
5 Conclusions and future research 
Overall, it can be said that despite the inherent difficulties and inevitable subjectivity 
when attempting to operationalise ethical theories in transport appraisal, this can be 
achieved with promising results as demonstrated. As Aldred (2012) put it: “if a large cut 
in emissions is to be made by society overall, everyone should ‘do their bit’ by making a 
particular kind of sacrifice rather than paying others to do it instead”. Thus, having 
applied selected ethical theories in the appraisal of policies for the uptake of LCVs in 
California, this paper has illustrated the potential improvements into CBA practice which 
can increase the decision makers’ overview of impact distribution (Figure 2) while 
continuing to benefit by the merits of CBA. Findings should be reviewed along with the 
urge to utilise multiple methods forming an integrated appraisal framework which 
incorporates CBA, modelling and ethical components since those can work in parallel 
and complement each other. It appears that system dynamics modelling represents a 
promising approach for addressing deeply uncertain dynamically complex societal 
challenges (Kwakkel and Pruyt, 2013). In summary, findings of this paper build up on 
previous findings (Harrison, 2013a, 2013b; Thomopoulos and Grant-Muller, 2013) and 
suggest that the stages to follow should be: 
• to identify relevant ethical and equity issues 
• to agree on the ethical theory to be used 
• to develop a model addressing these issues 
• to formulate mitigation policies acknowledging that the model should not be used in 
isolation but in combination with other methods such as CBA. 
Such an approach can lead to more informed decision making, noting though that any 
method should not be used as a crystal ball replacing policy makers. The latter 
corresponds with the findings of Mouter et al. (2013a) where the role of CBA in The 
Netherlands has been reviewed to conclude that CBA has a crucial role to play in policy 
making, yet it cannot substitute policy makers. Common practice and guidelines exist for 
selected developed countries (Mackie and Worsley, 2013); nevertheless these guidelines 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    An ethical assessment of low carbon vehicles using cost benefit analysis 243    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
may provide best practice examples whilst accommodating the needs of developing 
countries (Dimitriou and Gakenheimer, 2011) by allowing customisation of the appraisal 
to their respective context. The latter is founded on the grounds that there may have to be 
diversions based on different market prices, discount rates or time horizons. These 
findings are of particular interest for automotive manufacturers and policy makers 
following the COP21 agreement in Paris (UNFCCC, 2015). 
Overall, many may argue that policy makers will not find it easy to accommodate 
multiple concerns including ethical ones in their decisions (Wolff, 2011) despite it has 
been demonstrated that the assessment tool selection introduces both practical and ethical 
implications (Gasparatos and Scolobig, 2012). It becomes nonetheless evident through 
such analyses that the ethical element will gain increased importance in future 
environmental policy making as well as in academic debates supporting decision making 
and evaluation (Ersdal and Aven, 2008; Stern, 2013). 
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Notes 
1 For the purposes of this paper, equity theories, equity principles and ethical theories are 
considered to be synonymous as the focus is more on the application of such theories in the 
transport sector rather than in identifying their differences. 
2 The authors acknowledge the limitations of using household income quintiles as a proxy and 
anticipate that further research in this field should aim at using more accurate group indicators 
assuming that relevant data are available (see for example Thornton et al., 2011). These 
limitations may include the fact that households are in different stages of their income 
development cycle which may be more important at a micro level rather than a macro level. 
Abbreviations 
BCR benefit-cost ratio 
BEV battery electric vehicles 
CBA cost-benefit analysis 
cICEV conventional internal combustion engine vehicle 
ICE internal combustion engine 
LCV low carbon vehicle 
ZEV zero emission vehicle. 
